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April 2004 / Issue 15

 

 

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Pharmaceutical Pricing in Switzerland – a comparison with selected reference countries

 

Dr. Peter Bratschi, Lawyer and Ursula Eggenberger Stöckli, Lawyer and Pharmacist, Bratschi Emch & Partner, Berne, Switzerland

 

EU ADOPTS ITS FUTURE MEDICINES LEGISLATION

Thomas Tindemans, Esq. and Sasha Lewis, White & Case incorporating Forrester & Sutton, Brussels, Belgium

AN AGREEMENT TAKES TWO

Mikaela Lassborn, Esq. and Sasha Lewis, White & Case incorporating Forrester & Sutton, Brussels, Belgium

Ceiling in Greece on Promotional Expenses by Pharmaceutical Companies

Yannis Chryssospathis, Esq., M.&P. Law Offices, Athens, Greece

 

PARALLEL TRADE IN GREECE/COURT JUDGEMENTS

Yannis Chryssospathis, Esq., M.&P. Law Offices, Athens, Greece

 

CHANGE IN PHARMACEUTICAL REIMBURSEMENT PROCEDURE IN FINLAND

 

Pauliina Tenhunen, Esq. & Anna-Maria Palmroos, Esq., Castrén & Snellman, Helsinki, Finland

 

Some Aspects of Latest Developments in Reimbursement and Pricing of Pharmaceuticals in Germany

 

Prof. Dr. med. Iur Alexander P.F. Ehlers, Esq. & Dr. Oliver Sude, Esq., Ehlers, Ehlers & Partner, Munich, Germany

 

 

 

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Pharmaceutical Pricing in Switzerland – a comparison with selected reference countries

 

Dr. Peter Bratschi, Lawyer and Ursula Eggenberger Stöckli, Lawyer and Pharmacist, Bratschi Emch & Partner, Berne, Switzerland

 

The Swiss Industry associations, Interpharma and VIPS, approached IMS Consulting to undertake an analysis of the prices of pharmaceutical products in Switzerland compared to selected comparator countries. The following summarizes the most important findings of the report, published in September 2003.

 

1.    Prescription Drug Pricing in Switzerland: Background

Prices of reimbursed pharmaceuticals are fixed by the Federal Office of Social Insurance. The Swiss drug price control is based on therapeutic comparison within therapeutic groups and on international comparison with prices of other countries. The price, in general, should not exceed the average of the prices awarded in Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK, which are considered to be "economically comparable in the pharmaceutical sector". The prices of 'subsidiary' countries, Austria, Italy and France, are also monitored and can be referenced, but they are supposed to serve as a "general indicator" only if a product is not available in several of the other reference countries. Since 2001, comparisons have been made on the basis of ex-manufacturer prices rather than retail prices as previously.

After 15 years on the market, or at patent expiry, the price of the product is once again compared with prices in Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, and if necessary, adjusted to the average in these countries. This comparison is made at ex-manufacturer price level as well.

 

In July 2001, a new margin system has been introduced. Under the new system, pharmacists receive a fixed dispensing fee per pack, depending on the manufacturer's selling price, and a fee for services offered (e.g. patient counseling). This system changed the retail prices of most pharmaceutical products on the reimbursement list. It has been introduced in order to remove financial incentives to pharmacists and dispensing doctors to dispense more expensive products.

 

2.    Results

Prices of the top 100 reimbursed products in Switzerland have been compared to the prices of different countries. There were three reference groups: Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK; Austria, Italy and France; the USA, Sweden and Canada.

The comparison has been done on different levels and is based on prices in the second quarter 2003, which have been indexed.

 

2.1  Public Level Comparison including VAT

At public prices, the analysis reflected the significant differences between margin structures and value-added tax (VAT) rates charged by the countries. The comparison between individual countries shows that prices were the highest in Austria, followed by Germany. Swiss prices were very close to those of Denmark and the Netherlands. Sweden, France, the USA and the UK have lower prices than Switzerland.

 

In terms of the reference price groups, Swiss prices were lower than the European comparator groups, but higher than the group with the USA, Sweden and Canada.

 

 

2.2  Ex-manufacturer Level Comparison

Findings at ex-manufacturer level show average wholesaler purchase prices, without the impact of pharmacy and wholesaler margins or VAT. At this level, Switzerland was the most expensive among all nine European countries compared in the analysis. Austria was the least expensive, Italy and France showed the next lowest prices, at 75% of the average Swiss ex-manufacturer price. The highest price has been seen in the USA at 135% of the Swiss price.

In terms of the reference groups, the group with Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK was closest to Switzerland, but still significantly lower at 85% of the average Swiss price. The group with Austria, France and Italy had the lowest prices, with an average indexed price of 77% of that of Switzerland.

 

2.3  Indexed to Purchasing Power Parities

Purchasing power parities (PPP) are the rates of conversion that eliminate the differences in price levels between countries.

At the public price level in the PPP indexed analysis, prices in all countries except Sweden become relatively greater than Swiss prices (up to 194 in Austria compared to 100 in Switzerland). When the relative PPP is included at the ex-manufacturer level, it makes a significant difference when compared with the public level. In most countries it is closer to the Swiss index of 100 and only Denmark has a lower average price at 94% of the Swiss price. The highest price at this level has the USA with 187 compared to 100 in Switzerland.

The including of PPP leads to a significantly difference to the ex-manufacturer price comparisons excluding PPP, where Switzerland is the most expensive of the countries (except the USA). For example, Germany and the UK go from being 14 and 13 points respectively below Switzerland at ex-manufacturer level to 20 and 12 points above when PPP is factored into the analysis.

 

3.    Conclusions

  • Analysis of indexed, average prices for the 100 reimbursed products in the 2nd quarter 2003 revealed that at public price level, when VAT is included if applicable, prices were the highest in Austria, followed by Germany. Swiss prices were very close to those of Denmark and the Netherlands.
  • Viewed in terms of the three reference groups, Swiss prices were lower than the two European comparator groups at the public price level (including VAT).
  • When indexed to PPPs, Switzerland had one of the lowest average price indices, with only Sweden falling below the index of 100 at the public price level.
  • The ex-manufacturer analysis indicated that Swiss prices were highest amongst the European countries with only USA prices exceeding those of Switzerland.

 

·        Points to consider

  • When considering public level prices, it should be borne in mind that there are certain country differences that may influence the public price that cannot be captured in this report. For example, in Austria the pharmacy margins are high when comparing with other countries. However, in Austria pharmacies also have to give a discount to the Krankenkasse for reimbursed drugs. As this discount is not fixed but depends upon volume sales, it has not been included in this report. By contrast, in Germany there is a 6% discount to the Krankenkassen. As this is a fixed amount, it has been taken into account.
  • A further factor, that cannot be taken into account in this analysis is the potential different systems for compensating of 'paying' pharmacists for their role in providing a medicine to a patient. The systems vary from countries, where the pharmacies are compensated based upon a 'percentage mark-up' system to countries where a patient co-payment might contribute to a pharmacist's payment.
  • Lastly, it should be noted, that this type of analysis cannot measure the redistribution of finance in the supply chain in different countries.

 

As a whole, the study has been ordered by the Swiss industry associations in order to show that the Swiss price level is not as much higher than in other countries as some patient and consumer organizations in Switzerland claim. From the Swiss point of view, one of the main fault is, that the analysis does not taken into account the new system that has been introduced in Switzerland in July 2001 and that has significantly changed the final, public price of reimbursed products. According to this system, pharmacists and dispensing doctors receive a dispensing fee per pack and a fee for services offered.

But despite some faults, the report can give an idea on prices of pharmaceutical products in different countries and on different levels.

The report as a whole (in English) can be down-loaded from Interpharma's web-site (www.interpharma.ch -> news).

 

 

EU ADOPTS ITS FUTURE MEDICINES LEGISLATION

Thomas Tindemans, Esq. and Sasha Lewis, White & Case incorporating Forrester & Sutton, Brussels, Belgium

 

Adoption of the EU’s revised pharmaceuticals legislation will be finalised before enlargement.

 

The review of EU pharmaceutical legislation reached its final stage on December 17, 2003, when the European Parliament adopted two Directives and a Regulation which will regulate the pharmaceutical industry in Europe for at least the next decade. The EU Council of Ministers still has to give its final seal of approval to the “Future Medicines Legislation” or “FML”, but this is more or less a formality.  Thus the new legislation will, as the Commission hoped, be in place when the EU welcomes 10 new Member States on May 1, 2004.  The EU’s enlargement will create the world’s largest pharmaceutical market, with five million consumers. The new Member States are bound to implement the FML, like any other Member State.

 

When the Commission launched its “Pharma Review” in 2001, Enterprise Commissioner Erkki Liikanen explained that its aims were as follows:

 

·        to ensure the continued protection of public health;

·        to improve the single market in pharmaceuticals and increase the competitiveness of Europe’s pharmaceutical industry; and

·        to prepare for enlargement.

 

The new Regulation aims to give the European Medicines Evaluation Agency (EMEA) a more important role, notably by increasing the number of types of medicines subject to the centralised system for obtaining a marketing authorisation to include orphan drugs and treatments for HIV, cancer, diabetes and neurodegenerative diseases.  At a later stage, the centralised procedure will be extended to cover all viral infections and autoimmune diseases. The EMEA will also offer more scientific and regulatory advice to the industry. Its procedures will be updated to respond to its increased responsibilities and the effects of enlargement.  A new fast-track procedure will reduce the time taken to review applications for marketing authorisations by at least two months.  It will be possible to obtain a conditional authorisation to allow a product to be marketed earlier in the development stage.  Compassionate use of a product will also be allowed, so that patients successfully treated during clinical trials can continue to use the product during the authorisation assessment.

 

The conflict between ensuring appropriate clinical data protection for R&D companies, and enhancing the possibilities for generics producers to develop equivalent products, was one of the most controversial elements throughout the process of adopting the new legislation. This conflict was sharpened by the escalating health budgets of the current Member States, and their resulting wish to encourage the prescription of generic products where possible. The FML resolves the problem as follows.  In future, the standard period of regulatory data protection will be ten years in all Member States.  After eight years, a generics producer will be allowed to apply for an authorisation to market a generic copy of the product.  Thus the product will be ready for marketing as soon as the ten-year data exclusivity period expires.  However, if the holder of a marketing authorisation discovers a new therapeutic indication for an existing product during those eight years, and obtains a new marketing authorisation for that indication, the data exclusivity period may be extended for a further year. Hence protection may last for up to eleven years, although to take account of the needs of the new Member States, the new protection periods will not be retrospective, and apply only to new substances that receive a marketing authorisation as from 2006.  As a further benefit to the generics industry, it will in future be possible to authorise a copy of a product in a given Member State, even when the copied “EU reference” product is being marketed in another Member State.

 

Other amendments introduced by the Parliament in second reading include revised definitions of medicines and certain categories of pharmaceutical products (homeopathic, generic, biogeneric etc.) with a view to establishing clearly which legislation is applicable to the product in question.  However, the Commission’s proposals in the original draft legislation to allow direct information to patients on treatment for certain specific disease groups (HIV, cancer, immunoviral diseases) have been dropped from the final texts - predictably, as they aroused opposition from Members of the European Parliament for fear of opening the door to advertising of prescription drugs.  At the Parliament’s request, the Commission will now carry out a study of this issue before deciding whether to propose new legislation.

 

Once the Council has given its final approval to the new package and the legislation has been published in the Official Journal, Member States will have 18 months (i.e. until 2006) in which to implement the two new Directives on human and veterinary products.  (The Regulation, of course, has direct effect).  Pharmaceutical companies would be well-advised to monitor the implementation process carefully, especially in the new Member States. For example, some acceding countries may seek derogations from the provisions on regulatory data protection.

 

 

AN AGREEMENT TAKES TWO

Mikaela Lassborn, Esq. and Sasha Lewis, White & Case incorporating Forrester & Sutton, Brussels, Belgium

 

Like the European Court of First Instance, the European Court of Justice holds that Bayer and its French and Spanish wholesalers did not illegally agree to limit parallel imports.

 

On 6 January 2004, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) delivered its judgment in the Bayer/Adalat case. (1) It agreed with the Court of First Instance (CFI) that Bayer had not made an agreement with its French and Spanish wholesalers to limit parallel exports. Tarius users will recall that a 1996 decision by the European Commission condemned and fined Bayer for limiting supplies of its product Adalat to certain wholesalers in France and Spain during the 1980’s and 1990’s.  Bayer supplied wholesalers with quantities which would satisfy domestic demand, but  refused or reduced orders for excess supplies likely to be used for parallel trade. Bayer’s standard contractual terms on the basis of which sales were made did not specifically prohibit the making of exports.  However, it was generally known that Bayer wanted to prevent exports, and its policy was unpopular with traders, who complained to the Commission. In onsite investigations, the Commission found documents confirming that Bayer was conducting a campaign against parallel exports. The Commission therefore condemned Bayer for infringing Article 81(1) EC Treaty, by concluding with its (admittedly reluctant) wholesalers an unwritten agreement which formed part of their continuous commercial relations and had the purpose and effect of limiting competition, as well as a significant effect on trade between Member States.

 

However, the CFI annulled the decision on 26 October 2000, holding that the Commission had failed to prove Bayer and the wholesalers had agreed to limit exports, as it had not shown there was any agreement between them. The existence of an agreement must be shown from the:

 

 “concurrence of wills between economic operators and the implementation of a policy, the pursuit of an objective, or the adoption of a given line of conduct on the market.” (2)

 

Clearly, before proving that an agreement restricts competition, it must be shown that the agreement actually exists. 

 

In the appeal to the ECJ, the main question was what constitutes an agreement. The Commission claimed the CFI had adopted an over-restrictive interpretation which went against earlier case-law. However, Advocate General Tizzano's Opinion on the appeal agreed with the approach of the CFI. The Advocate General pointed out that in earlier cases there had been evidence of an agreement, either because the producer’s invoices specifically indicated that export was forbidden, or because supplies were made on the basis of individual distribution agreements between the producer and the wholesaler which included provisions limiting or prohibiting exports.  He argued that there must be an (at least tacit) offer or request to enter into an agreement, and that it would be absurd to consider that an agreement could be concluded through an implicit acceptance of an offer which had not (even tacitly) been made.  Bayer had not requested or required the wholesalers to do anything regarding the final destination of its products, but instead had "developed a method making it possible for the company unilaterally to achieve the result of eliminating or reducing parallel imports without the need to cooperate with the wholesalers", by adjusting its supplies unilaterally to local demand.

 

The ECJ agreed that an anti-competitive agreement:

 

 “cannot be based on what is only the expression of a unilateral policy of one of the contracting parties, which can be put into effect without the assistance of others.

 

In earlier cases, the manufacturers had sought the cooperation of wholesalers to reduce or eliminate parallel trade. They had effectively demanded a particular line of conduct by inserting the words ‘export prohibited’ on invoices, and the wholesalers had agreed to this by continuing to order products without protesting

about the export ban.  However, in Bayer’s case, the combined effect of a quota system with the obligation on wholesalers to maintain national stocks, but without an express requirement to limit exports:

 

“merely serves to demonstrate the unilateral nature of Bayer’s policy, which could be carried out without the cooperation of the wholesalers. […] Therefore, the mere fact that there is a hindrance to parallel imports is not sufficient to demonstrate the existence of an [anti-competitive] agreement.”

 

The ECJ added that the co-existence of an agreement which was competitively neutral, with a measure restricting competition that was imposed unilaterally, did not result in an anti-competitive agreement:

 

“the mere fact that a measure adopted by a manufacturer, which has the object or effect of restricting competition, falls within the context of continuous business relations between the manufacturer and its wholesalers, is not sufficient for a finding that such an agreement exists.”

 

The judgment is extremely important for the pharmaceutical industry, since it clarifies that unilateral measures to reduce parallel trade which can be implemented without involving third parties are not necessarily illegal, although they may be if:

 

“though apparently adopted unilaterally by the manufacturer in the context of its contractual relations with its dealers, [they] nevertheless receive at least the tacit acquiescence of those dealers."

 

Many pharmaceutical companies which have introduced or are planning to introduce a quota system will be somewhat comforted that a unilateral quota system falls outside Article 81 and can be used as a means to limit the damages of parallel trade. On the other hand, it should be kept in mind that quota systems are not per se legal. Each system is different and will have to be assessed on its merits. Bayer/Adalat did not address the question of whether applying a quota system to products over which the manufacturer is considered to have a dominant position may be considered an abuse of dominance. A case on this question is currently pending before the ECJ in a referral by the Hellenic Competition Committee.(3)  The Commission is also starting to look into the quota systems notified to it.  At the end of 2003 the Commission sent questionnaires to pharmaceutical companies that had notified quota systems.  Clearly the parallel trade wars are not over yet.

Footnote (1):  Joined Cases C-2/01P and C-3/01P.  The appeals were lodged separately but dealt with together by the ECJ.

Footnote (2):  Paragraph 173. 

Footnote (3):  Case C-53/03, Syphate et al v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC.

 

 

Ceiling in Greece on Promotional Expenses by Pharmaceutical Companies

 

Yannis Chryssospathis, Esq., M.&P. Law Offices, Athens, Greece

 

On May 2002 the Greek authorities published on the Official Journal a ministerial decision which limits the level of the annually promotional spending by pharmaceutical companies.

 

According to the ministerial decision in question a cap has been provided on promotional spending which constitutes a % on the annual turnover of the pharmaceutical companies.

 

The industry reacted immediately by considering the capping as an unfair treatment among companies, and the ministerial decision as unconstitutional.

The authorities responded by publishing a new ministerial decision on December 2002, with which the % on the turnover of the companies was increased.

 

Following that the Hellenic Association of Pharmaceutical Companies lodged on March 2003 an application to the highest administrative Court, the Council of State, for the annulment of the ministerial decision on the basis that the restrictions on promotional expenses is unconstitutional since it establishes a financial ceiling which restricts economic freedom.

 

The Court with its decision, which was published recently, rejected the application on the basis that the situation with other companies and pharmaceutical companies is not identical, since the latter are focussing on selling medicinal products, a social good of exceptional importance for the public interest.

 

No appeal can be submitted against the decision in question.

 

 

PARALLEL TRADE IN GREECE/COURT JUDGEMENTS

Yannis Chryssospathis, Esq., M.&P. Law Offices, Athens, Greece

 

An arising number of Judgements of the First Instance Court of Athens issued on 2003 considered as not being unjustified the refusal of a pharmaceutical company to supply the total quantities ordered by the wholesalers who suddenly are asking for significantly increasing volumes of products.

 

More particularly according to the reasoning of some of these Judgements, the sued pharmaceutical companies are defending their financial interests consisting in avoiding the emergence of problems in the company's organisational structure, over the interests of the suing wholesale companies, that result from the supply of the products of the sued pharmaceutical company in Europe.

 

Further on, according to the reasoning of the Judgements in question, in case that the refusal of the pharmaceutical company to sell a product would be considered unjustified, the said company could be obliged to supply the wholesale company with unlimited quantities of its products, if the latter might request it, endangering in this way, the whole trading of the mother company of the sued one.

 

This could take place since, according to the Judgements; a major part of the European trade of the particular products would be supplied through the exports from Greece, to the detriment of the Greek patient.

The wholesalers lodged appeals against the Judgements of the First Instance Court of Athens.

 

It remains to be seen how the Court of Appeal will handle the matter.

 

 

CHANGE IN PHARMACEUTICAL REIMBURSEMENT PROCEDURE IN FINLAND

 

Pauliina Tenhunen, Esq. & Anna-Maria Palmroos, Esq., Castrén & Snellman, Helsinki, Finland

 

 

1.      The European Court of Justice Rules on Pharmaceutical Reimbursement Procedures in Finland

On 12 June 2003, the European Court of Justice ruled that Finland breaks transparency rules of governance in its decisions on special reimbursements for medicinal products and does not honor proscribed deadlines. The European Commission filed the complaint.

The European Court of Justice noted that Finland had not implemented the principles set forth in Council Directive 89/105/EEC relating to transparency of measures regulating the pricing and reimbursement of medicinal products.

The Court stated that, by not adopting any laws or regulations necessary to comply with the Directive as regards the decisions establishing the categories of medicinal products subject to a higher-rate of health insurance coverage, Finland failed to fulfill its obligations under the first and second subparagraphs of Article 6 of the Directive.

The Court concluded that the existing procedure, under which the primary decision establishing which medicinal products qualify for the higher-rate scheme and which was developed by the Council of Ministers’ and the subsequent decision by the Institute for Social Security, was not compatible with the Directive. The Court criticized Finland for its practice of not giving concerned persons the any opportunity to argue their point of view during the decision-making procedure. Under this procedure, the competent authorities were under no obligation to give reasons for the inclusion or exclusion of an active ingredient in the higher-rate coverage scheme.

1.1  Amendment to the Sickness Insurance Act enters into force on 1 January  2004

The latest amendment to the Sickness Insurance Act (1151/2003) takes into account Council Directive 89/105/EEC and the decision of the European Court of Justice. The amendment to the Act entered into force on 1 January 2004.

Subsequently, the reimbursement proceedings regarding the medicinal products that qualify for the higher-rate scheme were altered. The determination of the special reimbursability and a reasonable wholesale price of such medicinal products is now subject to proceedings initiated upon application to the Pharmaceuticals’ Pricing Board. With certain exceptions, only the holder of the marketing authorization for the medicinal product or a contact person based in Finland may apply. Under in certain circumstances, the Pharmaceuticals Pricing Board may also examine the matter pursuant to a proposal of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health.

The decision of the Pharmaceutical’s pricing Board to include a medicinal product within a higher rate of insurance coverage must now be made within 90 and 180 days. The decision of Board will be in force for a maximum period of five years, and a decision on a product containing a new active substance will be in force for a maximum period of three years. In certain instances the Board will obtain an opinion from an established expert group. As a rule, a medicine may be approved in the special reimbursement category when it has been included into the basic reimbursement category for two years. An earlier acceptance is also possible, however, when certain requirements are met.

Decisions made by the Pharmaceuticals’ Pricing Board can be appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court. The rules regarding matters such as the reasoning of each judgment also now apply as provided in the Administrative Procedure Act (2003/434).

 

 

Some Aspects of Latest Developments in Reimbursement and Pricing of Pharmaceuticals in Germany

 

Prof. Dr. med. Dr. iur Alexander P.F. Ehlers, Esq. & Dr. Oliver Sude, Esq., Ehlers, Ehlers & Partner, Munich, Germany

 

In general, pricing by the marketing authorisation holder is not regulated in Germany. A notification of the price to the authorities is the only requirement. The price becomes effective when it is incorporated in the Lauer Taxe (official price list). Even though drug prices are officially unregulated, the authorities have tried to influence them through the introduction of a negative list and a reference price system. The costs for drugs which are not over-the-counter-drugs, or ones on the negative list and not covered by the reference price-system, are fully reimbursed.

 

The reference price system was introduced in 1989. The idea behind this system was to establish an upper limit for the costs reimbursable through the statutory sickness funds. According to § 35 SGB V (Social Code Volume 5), a reference price is set for each drug based on the price about products in the group into which they are allocated. The Gemeinsamer Bundesausschuss (Joint Federal Committee) which consists of doctors and representatives of sickness funds, classifies drugs into three categories for the purposes of setting the reference price: pharmaceuticals with the same medicinal substance (level 1), pharmaceuticals with a comparable medicinal substance and therapeutically equal (level 2) and pharmaceuticals which are therapeutically equal, particularly combination products (level 3). The reference price is the maximum amount reimbursed. If the price is higher, the patient must pay the difference in addition to the normal co-payment.

 

In 1996 the former German government incorporated a patent protection clause in the reference price system. No drug which received its marketing authorisation after the end of 1995 should be included in a level 2 or level 3 reference prices until its own patent expires. On 1 January 2004, the Act on the Modernisation of the Statutory Health Insurance Funds (Gesetz zur Modernisierung der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung – GMG-Act) took effect. One of the main alterations of this reform concerning the reference price-system is that from now on also patented drugs may be allocated into level 2 groups (pharmaceuticals with a comparable medicinal substance and therapeutically equal) provided this group contains at least three drugs protected by patents. Whereas the pharmaceutical industry considers this alteration as an erosion of patent protection, the government aims at further savings within the drug sector and the strengthening of price competition among patent protected pharmaceuticals. 

 

Another new aspect within the German health care system with regard to the pricing of pharmaceuticals is the possibility of negotiating individual contracts between service providers and the statutory health insurance funds (§ 140 a SGB V). However, these provisions apply only to the so-called integrated care system. In the past, Germany’s health care system was widely divided into a hospital sector and an office based physician (out-patient) sector. Within an integrated care agreement, hospitals may offer highly specialised out-patient care. In order to ensure the necessary supply of pharmaceuticals with regard to the specified field of treatment, the partners of such agreements may involve pharmacies (hospital supply pharmacies, mail order pharmacies as well as officinal pharmacies) and conclude corresponding contracts with them. On the one hand, pharmacies may use their increasing demand for the respective pharmaceuticals in order to negotiate discounts with the manufacturers. On the other hand, manufacturers of pharmaceuticals may make use of this possibility to secure the sales of their products without competition within one integrated care model. In General, the integrated care sector may be regarded as a field with a larger scope for individual solutions within Germany’s strictly regulated public health care sector.

 

Additional Information on the New Quarterly Doctor’s Fee

 

 

According to § 28 sec. 4 SGB V (Social Code Volume 5) persons covered by the statutory health insurance plan who are older than 18 years are required to pay € 10 per quarter for the first consultation of a physician, a dentist or a physiotherapist within the outpatient sector. This measure introduced by the Act on the Modernisation of the Statutory Health Insurance Funds (Gesetz zur Modernisierung der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung – GMG-Act) which took effect on 1 January 2004 has proved deeply unpopular among the German public. There are even already the first complaints of unconstitutionality pending with the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court). Nevertheless, a first request for a provisional order to stop the doctor’s fees has been rejected by the Social Court of Cologne stating that the physician’s obligation to recover these fees would not infringe the right to freely exercise one’s profession granted by the constitution. Whereas the public discussion continues the competent politicians have already made clear that they would not track back the doctor’s fee within the next five years.    

 

 

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Disclaimer:

This Newsletter is intended to provide general information on the members of conférence bleue and on recent developments of relevance to the pharmaceutical sector. The information and opinions which it contains are not intended to provide legal advice, and should not be treated as a substitute for specific advice concerning particular situations.

 

Editor

Kathleen M. Dwyer
Managing Director
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conférence bleue members

Austria: Schönherr Rechtsanwälte, Tuchlauben 17, P.O. Box 41, A-1014 Vienna, www.schoenherr.at

Belgium: White & Case LL.P. incorporating Forrester & Sutton, 62, rue de la Loi, B-1040 Brussels, www.whitecase.com

Denmark: Jonas Bruun, Bredgade 38, DK-1260 Copenhagen K, www.jonasbruun.dk

Finland: Castrén & Snellman, Attorneys at Law, Erottajankatu 5A, FIN-00130 Helsinki, www.castren.fi

France: Bird & Bird, Centre d'Affaires Edouard VII, 6 Rue de Caumartin, Paris 75009, www.twobirds.com

Germany: Ehlers, Ehlers & Partner, Rechtsanwaltssocietät, Widenmayerstrasse 29, D-80538 Munich, www.eep-law.de

Greece: M. & P. Bernitsas Law Offices, 5, Lykavittou Street, GR-106 72 Athens, www.bernitsaslawoffices.gr

Hungary: S.B.G.&K. PATENT AND LAW OFFICES, Andrássy ÚT 113, H-1062 Budapest, Mailing address: P.O. Box 360, H-1369, www.sbgk.hu

Ireland: Matheson Ormsby Prentice, 30 Herbert Street, Dublin 2, www.mop.ie

Italy: Avvocati Associati Franzosi Dal Negro Pensato Setti, Via Brera 5, I-20121 Milan, www.franzosi.com

Netherlands: Stibbe, Strawinskylaan 2001, NL-1077 ZZ Amsterdam, www.stibbe.com

Norway: Advokatfirmaet Haavind Vislie DA, Raadhusgaten 27, P.O. Box 359, N-0101 Oslo, www.haavind.no

Portugal: Carlos de Sousa e Brito & Associados Advogados, Rua Castilho, ◦712◦ Dto., P-1250-068 Lisbon, www.csbadvogados.pt

Spain: Jausàs, Advocats, Avda. Diagonal, 407 bis, E-08008 Barcelona, www.jnv.com

Sweden: RydinCarlsten, Advokatbyra AB, Norrmalmstorg 14, P.O. Box 1766, SE-11187 Stockholm, www.rydincarlsten.se

Switzerland: Bratschi Emch & Partner, Advokaturbureau, Bollwerk 15, P.O. Box 5576, CH-3001 Bern and Bahnhofstrasse 106, 8023 Zürich, www.bep.ch

United Kingdom: Arnold & Porter, Tower 42, 25 Old Broad Street, London EC2N 1 HQ, www.arnoldporter.com

 

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